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FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
  
No. 13-2212 
 
 
CHRISTINA LYNN JACOBS, 
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   Defendants – Appellees, 
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Before KEENAN, FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges. 
 
 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by published 
opinion. Judge Floyd wrote the opinion, in which Judge Keenan 
and Judge Harris joined. 
 
 
ARGUED: Vanessa Katherine Lucas, EDELSTEIN & PAYNE, Raleigh, 
North Carolina, for Appellant.  Kathryn Hicks Shields, NORTH 
CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 
Appellees.  ON BRIEF: Lisa Grafstein, Mercedes Restucha-Klem, 
DISABILITY RIGHTS NORTH CAROLINA, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 
Appellant.  Roy Cooper, North Carolina Attorney General, Grady 
L. Balentine, Jr., Special Deputy Attorney General, NORTH 
CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 
Appellees.  Brian East, DISABILITY RIGHTS TEXAS, Austin, Texas, 
for Amici Curiae.
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FLOYD, Circuit Judge 
Christina Jacobs worked as a deputy clerk at a courthouse 
in New Hanover County, North Carolina.  Although she allegedly 
suffered from social anxiety disorder, her employer assigned her 
to provide customer service at the courthouse front counter.  
Believing that her mental illness hindered her ability to 
perform this inherently social task, Jacobs requested an 
accommodation--to be assigned to a role with less direct 
interpersonal interaction.  Her employer waited three weeks 
without acting on her request and then terminated her.   
Jacobs brought suit against her employer under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).  The district court 
granted summary judgment to the employer on all counts.  Because 
the district court erred by resolving disputed facts in favor of 
the movant and for the reasons that follow, we reverse the grant 
of summary judgment in part and remand for trial. 
 
I. 
 Christina Jacobs has suffered from mental illness since 
childhood.1  At ten, Jacobs was diagnosed with severe situational 
                                                 
1 In reviewing de novo the district court’s order granting 
summary judgment to the North Carolina Administrative Office of 
the Courts, we “view the facts and all justifiable inferences 
arising therefrom in the light most favorable to” Jacobs, as the 
nonmoving party.  Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 
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performance anxiety.  At twelve, she was hospitalized for 
several days after threatening harm to herself and others.  
During her hospitalization she was diagnosed with mood disorder 
and selective mutism, and prescribed antidepressants.  At the 
age of 18, she received an additional diagnosis of social 
anxiety disorder for which she has been treated intermittently 
by several physicians.  
 Social anxiety disorder is characterized by a “marked and 
persistent fear of . . . social or performance situations in 
which [a] person is exposed to unfamiliar people or to possible 
scrutiny by others.”  Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 456 (4th ed. 2000) 
[hereinafter DSM-IV]. 2   A person suffering from social anxiety 
disorder either “avoid[s]” the feared social or performance 
situations, or “endure[s them] with intense anxiety or 
distress.”  Id.  A person can only be diagnosed with social 
anxiety disorder when the “avoidance, anxious anticipation, or 
distress in the feared social or performance situation(s) 
interferes significantly with the person’s normal routine, 
occupational . . . functioning, or social activities or 
                                                                                                                                                             
308, 312 (4th Cir. 2013).  The following statement of facts 
conforms to this standard. 
2 We take judicial notice of the DSM-IV (and not the current 
DSM-V) because the expert witnesses in this case applied the 
diagnostic criteria of the DSM-IV.  Fed. R. Evid. 201. 
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relationships . . . .”  Id.  The American Psychiatric 
Association (APA) notes that social anxiety disorder can create 
a “vicious cycle of anticipatory anxiety leading to fearful 
cognition and anxiety . . . , which leads to actual or perceived 
poor performance . . . , which leads to embarrassment and 
increased anticipatory anxiety . . . .”  Id. at 451.  “A job 
promotion to a position requiring public speaking may result in 
the emergence of [social anxiety disorder] in someone who 
previously never needed to speak in public.”  Id. at 453.  
In January 2009, Jacobs was hired by Brenda Tucker, the 
elected clerk of court, as an office assistant in the criminal 
division of the North Carolina Administrative Office of the 
Courts (AOC).  As an office assistant, Jacobs’s job duties 
included microfilming and filing.  Less than a month after 
Jacobs started working, Tucker promoted her to the position of 
deputy clerk.3 
At the time of Jacobs’s employment, 30 total deputy clerks 
worked in the criminal division.  Four or five of the deputy 
clerks provided customer service at the division’s front 
counter.  The remaining deputy clerks performed other filing and 
record-keeping tasks, many of which do not require face-to-face 
                                                 
3 It is undisputed that at the time of her promotion Jacobs 
met or exceeded the minimum eligibility requirements for the 
position. 
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interaction with the public.4  AOC supervisors typically assigned 
the most junior deputy clerks to the front counter.  However, 
all deputy clerks--regardless of assignment and seniority--had 
the same title and job description. 
 In March 2009, Jacobs began training to work at the front 
counter.  She was assigned to work four days a week at the front 
counter and one day a week microfilming.  Jacobs soon began to 
experience extreme stress, nervousness, and panic attacks while 
working at the front counter.  She became particularly panicked 
when she was asked a question to which she did not immediately 
know the answer--a common occurrence when working behind the 
counter.  She attributed these symptoms to her diagnosed social 
anxiety disorder. 
 On or about May 5, 2009, Jacobs went to a supervisor, Debra 
Excell, and told Excell that she had social anxiety disorder and 
was not feeling healthy while working at the front counter.  
Jacobs told Excell that she had received treatment (including 
medication) for mental health issues while in college, but that 
she was not currently under a doctor’s care.  Excell encouraged 
Jacobs to seek treatment from the doctor who had helped her in 
                                                 
4  For example, disposition and continuance clerks work 
primarily on the computer and do not provide direct customer 
service.  
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college.  After her meeting with Excell, Jacobs went to a doctor 
and began receiving treatment for anxiety and depression.   
 Excell subsequently told Tucker about her conversation with 
Jacobs.  Tucker took handwritten notes on Excell’s oral account 
of her conversation with Jacobs, which included the phrases “too 
stressful,” “nerve issues,” “anxiety disorder,” and “might have 
to go back to [the doctor].”  J.A. 823.  Tucker’s assistant 
placed the notes in Jacobs’s personnel file. 
 During the course of her employment, Jacobs was never 
written up for any disciplinary infraction or performance issue.  
There are no notes in her personnel file indicating any problems 
with her performance.  Yet the AOC now alleges, inter alia, that 
Jacobs was a slow worker, impermissibly disclosed information to 
members of the public, and had outbursts with coworkers and 
supervisors.  The AOC has produced no documentary evidence (such 
as e-mails) corroborating these allegations. 
 On September 8, 2009, Jacobs sent an e-mail to her three 
immediate supervisors (Excell, Jan Kennedy, and Melissa Griffin) 
in which she disclosed her disability for a second time and 
requested an accommodation.  Specifically, Jacobs requested that 
she be “trained to fill a different role in the Clerk’s Office 
and perhaps work at the front counter only once a week.”  J.A. 
798.  The next day, Jacobs followed up in person with Kennedy.  
Kennedy told Jacobs that only Tucker had the power to act on 
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Jacobs’s request and, because Tucker was currently on a three-
week vacation, Jacobs would have to wait until Tucker returned.  
Soon after her meeting with Kennedy, Jacobs forwarded her e-mail 
request to Tucker.   
 While she was waiting for Tucker to return and address her 
accommodation request, Jacobs sought to use some accrued leave.  
Kennedy questioned Jacobs about why she wanted leave and denied 
her request.  Jacobs’s previous leave requests were not 
questioned and had always been approved.  
 Tucker alleges that while she was on vacation, she did not 
check her e-mail and asked to be called only in the event of an 
emergency.  She allegedly received a call from her assistant, 
Alice Radewicz, informing her that Jacobs had been spotted 
sleeping at her desk.  Tucker testified that this was the only 
call she received during her three-week absence.  
 Upon returning to the office on September 29, 2009, Tucker 
called Jacobs into her office for a meeting.  Excell, Kennedy, 
and Griffin were already in Tucker’s office when Jacobs arrived, 
where they had just concluded a meeting regarding Jacobs.  
Jacobs also saw a copy of her e-mail requesting an accommodation 
on Tucker’s desk, annotated in someone’s handwriting.  Tucker 
later testified that she had written the notes on the e-mail 
printout.  Jacobs assumed that the meeting was about her request 
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for an accommodation and recorded the meeting on a small 
personal audio recorder.   
Jacobs told Tucker that she had wanted to meet regarding 
“just what the e-mail said.”5  J.A. 827.  Tucker did not inquire 
as to what e-mail Jacobs was referring.  Instead, she told 
Jacobs that she was being fired because she was not “getting it” 
and Tucker did not “have any place [that she could] use 
[Jacobs’s] services.”  Id.  She did not mention Jacobs’s alleged 
sleeping on the job.  When Jacobs asked Tucker whether she was 
being fired “because of the e-mail,” Tucker responded that “it 
doesn’t have anything to do with the e-mail.”  Id. 
After her termination, Jacobs timely filed a Charge of 
Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC).  During the EEOC investigation, Tucker denied that she 
knew of Jacobs’s disability and that she had read the e-mail 
before deciding to terminate Jacobs.  After Jacobs received a 
favorable determination from the EEOC, the Department of Justice 
issued a Right to Sue letter. 
Jacobs then timely filed suit against the AOC and against 
Jan Kennedy (Tucker’s successor) in her official capacity as 
clerk of court.  Jacobs’s amended complaint alleges five causes 
                                                 
5  All quotations are to Jacobs’s recording of the 
termination meeting on page 827 of the joint appendix, and not 
to Jacobs’s transcription of the recording. 
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of action, 6  three of which are pertinent to this appeal: (i) 
disability discrimination under the ADA; (ii) failure to provide 
a reasonable accommodation under the ADA; and (iii) retaliation 
under the ADA.7  The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
 In a brief opinion, the district court granted the AOC’s 
motion for summary judgment.  Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of 
the Courts, No. 7:11-CV-169-BO, 2013 WL 4736171, at *1 (E.D.N.C. 
Sept. 3, 2013).  Although the AOC conceded for summary-judgment 
purposes that Jacobs had a disability, the district court found 
that Jacobs was not disabled as a matter of law and that she had 
                                                 
6 Jacobs’s complaint also alleged that the AOC committed a 
per se violation of the ADA by commingling her medical records 
with her personnel file.  The district court granted summary 
judgment because the ostensible “medical records” were 
voluntarily provided by Jacobs.  Jacobs does not appeal the 
grant of summary judgment on this claim, and we therefore save 
the question of whether the ADA’s confidentiality provisions 
apply to the voluntary disclosure of disability for another day.  
7  Jacobs purports to appeal two other causes of action: 
discrimination and retaliation under Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794); and wrongful discharge in 
violation of North Carolina public policy.  However, Jacobs 
failed to discuss these claims (except in passing) in the 
argument section of her opening brief, contrary to the 
requirement of Rule 28(a)(8)(A) of the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure that the brief contain “appellant's 
contentions and the reasons for them.”  Specifically, she did 
not challenge the district court’s finding that “stating a claim 
under the Rehabilitation Act is more difficult” than under the 
ADA.  J.A. 1039.  We therefore find that Jacobs has abandoned 
these claims on appeal.  Sandlands C & D LLC v. Cnty. of Horry, 
737 F.3d 45, 51 n.4 (4th Cir. 2013); Edwards v. City of 
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999).  
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therefore failed to establish a prima facie case of disability 
discrimination and failure to grant a reasonable accommodation.  
Id. at *3.  The district court also found that there was no 
evidence in the record that Tucker knew of Jacobs’s request for 
an accommodation at the time she decided to fire Jacobs, and 
that Jacobs therefore failed to establish a prima facie case of 
retaliation.  Id.  
 The district court entered judgment against Jacobs on 
September 3, 2013.  Jacobs timely appealed.  We have 
jurisdiction over final judgments of the district court pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
II. 
A. 
 Ordinarily we would begin our discussion with a brief 
restatement of the standard of review for a motion for summary 
judgment.  When “the opinion below reflects a clear 
misapprehension of summary judgment standards,” however, further 
elaboration is warranted.  Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 
1868 (2014) (per curiam).  A district court “shall grant summary 
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as 
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “A dispute is genuine 
if ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 
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party.’”  Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 
(4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 
F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012)).  “A fact is material if it 
‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’”  
Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 
(1986)). 
 In considering a motion for summary judgment, the district 
court must “view the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to 
the’” nonmoving party.  Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1866 (quoting 
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)).  
“Summary judgment cannot be granted merely because the court 
believes that the movant will prevail if the action is tried on 
the merits.”  10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller et al., 
Federal Practice & Procedure § 2728 (3d ed. 1998). 8   The court 
therefore cannot weigh the evidence or make credibility 
determinations.  Mercantile Peninsula Bank v. French (In re 
French), 499 F.3d 345, 352 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Anderson, 477 
U.S. at 255); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory Committee’s 
Note (1963) (“ Where an issue as to a material fact cannot be 
resolved without observation of the demeanor of witnesses in 
                                                 
8  As Professor Arthur Miller noted recently, “a motion 
designed simply for identifying trial-worthy issues has become, 
on occasion, a vehicle for resolving trial-worthy issues.”  
Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, 
and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of 
Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 286, 312 (2013).  
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order to evaluate their credibility, summary judgment is not 
appropriate.”).  
 The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari and issued a 
decision in a seemingly routine summary judgment case because 
the lower court had “fail[ed] to credit evidence that 
contradicted some of its key factual conclusions” and 
“improperly ‘weighed the evidence’ and resolved disputed issues 
in favor of the moving party.”  Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1866 
(brackets omitted) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).  
Specifically, the court of appeals (affirming the district 
court) repeatedly failed to credit the testimony of the 
plaintiff and members of his immediate family, which often 
contradicted the court’s statement of the “central facts” of the 
case.  Id. at 1866–67.  Because the court of appeals “weigh[ed] 
the evidence and reach[ed] factual inferences contrary to [the 
nonmovant’s] competent evidence,” the Supreme Court vacated the 
court’s affirmance of the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment.  Id. at 1868. 
 
B. 
 In this case, as in Tolan, the district court erred by 
failing to consider all of the evidence in the record.  The 
district court’s opinion also states the facts in the light most 
favorable to the AOC--not Jacobs, the nonmovant.  Strikingly, 
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both of the district court’s key factual findings--that Jacobs 
was not disabled and that Tucker did not learn of Jacobs’s 
accommodation request prior to terminating her--rest on factual 
inferences contrary to Jacobs’s competent evidence.  The 
district court thus improperly resolved factual issues at the 
summary judgment stage, in contravention of well-settled law.  
We discuss these errors in turn. 
 
1. 
 We begin by noting several examples of the district court’s 
misapplication of the summary judgment standard in its 
recitation of the facts. 
 First, the district court stated that Jacobs “had what was 
described as a ‘melt-down’ with a co-worker . . . [that] caused 
a disruption in the office . . . .”  J.A. 1034.  However, the 
co-worker allegedly involved in the outburst denied that it ever 
occurred.  The AOC witnesses who testified regarding the alleged 
outburst did not directly witness it and could not recall how 
they had learned about it.  
 Second, the district court accepted the AOC’s 
characterization of Jacobs’s May 5 meeting with Excell: “[T]he 
plaintiff told Debra Excell that she was having social issues 
and was nervous about working at the front counter.”  Id. 
(emphasis added).  Jacobs testified that she told Excell she had 
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social anxiety disorder--not mere “social issues.”  Tucker’s 
handwritten notes on her conversation with Excell regarding this 
meeting, in which she wrote the words “anxiety disorder,” 
support Jacobs’s account of the conversation.  
 Third, the district court stated as an undisputed fact that 
Jacobs “did not tell anyone she was disabled” in April or May of 
2009.  Id.  This is inconsistent with the testimony of Jacobs, 
Excell, and Tucker, who all agreed that Jacobs told Excell she 
had anxiety issues that were impacting her work and for which 
she had received medical treatment in the past.  
 Fourth and finally, the district court adopted the AOC’s 
erroneous contention that its expert witness failed to examine 
Jacobs because Jacobs did not consent to be examined.  See J.A. 
1035 (“[T]his was done in lieu of examining the plaintiff 
personally because she refused to submit to such an evaluation.” 
(emphasis added)).  As the record makes clear, the AOC never 
brought a motion for mental examination under Rule 35 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and did not respond to the 
offer by Jacobs’s counsel to proceed with such an examination 
without motion. 
 Considering the order in its entirety, we conclude that the 
district court impermissibly “credited the evidence of the party 
seeking summary judgment and failed properly to acknowledge key 
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evidence offered by the party opposing that motion.”  Tolan, 134 
S. Ct. at 1867–68.  This was error. 
 
2. 
 The district court also erred by concluding that Jacobs was 
not disabled within the meaning of the ADA.  During the course 
of discovery both parties produced expert testimony by mental 
health specialists on this issue.  After examining Jacobs, 
forensic psychologist Dr. Claudia Coleman concluded that “her 
mental disorders, Social Phobia and Anxiety Disorder, . . . 
constitute a disability as defined by the [ADA].”  J.A. 807.  
Forensic psychiatrist Dr. George Corvin, the AOC’s expert, did 
not examine Jacobs.  Instead, Dr. Corvin based his report on a 
review of her medical records, social media use, employment 
records, and the report of a private investigator who observed 
Jacobs while she was at work at a new job.  Dr. Corvin concluded 
that it was possible that Jacobs met the diagnostic criteria for 
social anxiety disorder but that “her medical records alone are 
insufficient to establish such a diagnosis.”  J.A. 222.  He also 
determined from the private investigator’s report that Jacobs 
was currently succeeding in a new customer service job, and 
thereby inferred that she had not experienced “any significant 
level of anxiety or other psychiatric impairment” while working 
at the AOC.  Id. 
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 The district court determined from “Dr. Corvin’s report and 
the plaintiff’s behavior [at] work” that Jacobs was not 
disabled.  J.A. 1038.  Inexplicably, the district court omits 
any mention of Dr. Coleman’s conflicting report.  Additionally, 
Dr. Corvin’s report simply does not support the district court’s 
finding of no disability--rather, Dr. Corvin concluded only that 
Jacobs’s medical records were equivocal on this question.  
 As in Tolan, the district court “neglected to adhere to the 
fundamental principle that at the summary judgment stage, 
reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving 
party.”  134 S. Ct. at 1868.  Rather, the court incorrectly drew 
all inferences in favor of the AOC, not Jacobs.  We therefore 
reverse the district court’s determination that there is no 
genuine dispute as to whether Jacobs had a disability. 
 
3. 
 The district court also determined that “there is no 
evidence that Ms. Tucker knew that the plaintiff had requested 
an accommodation at the time she made the decision to terminate 
her.”  J.A. 1038 (emphasis added).  This finding has no basis in 
the record. 
 Rather, the record taken in the light most favorable to 
Jacobs demonstrates just the opposite.  It is undisputed that 
Jacobs e-mailed her request for an accommodation to Tucker on 
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September 9, 2009.  Jacobs also e-mailed her request to her 
immediate supervisors, and discussed her request in person with 
Kennedy.  Kennedy told Jacobs that she could not act on Jacobs’s 
request without discussing it first with Tucker.  Upon returning 
to the office on September 29, Tucker held a meeting with 
Jacobs’s immediate supervisors--Kennedy, Excell, and Griffin.  
Kennedy testified that the supervisors discussed Jacobs during 
this meeting.  Tucker then called Jacobs into the meeting, and 
summarily fired her in front of Kennedy, Excell, and Griffin.  A 
reasonable jury could infer from these facts that before Jacobs 
walked in, any or all of Jacobs’s supervisors would have 
discussed the accommodation request e-mail. 
 The record taken in the light most favorable to Jacobs also 
demonstrates that Tucker read the e-mail before firing Jacobs.  
When Jacobs entered Tucker’s office she saw an annotated copy of 
her request for accommodation sitting on Tucker’s desk.  Tucker 
admits to having annotated the e-mail but testified that she did 
so only after the meeting.  Tucker cannot remember when she 
printed the e-mail but testified that it may have been during 
the meeting and that she first read the e-mail during the 
meeting.  This account is inconsistent with the audio recording 
of the meeting, which a reasonable jury could find does not 
contain any pauses long enough to account for Tucker finding and 
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printing the e-mail.  A reasonable jury could credit Jacobs’s 
testimony over Tucker’s on this factual question. 
 Finally, Tucker’s statements during the termination meeting 
indicate that she knew about Jacobs’s accommodation request.  At 
the beginning of the meeting, Jacobs said she wanted to discuss 
“just what the e-mail said.”  J.A. 827.  Tucker did not ask to 
what e-mail Jacobs was referring.  Instead, Tucker told Jacobs 
that, at the time of her hiring, Jacobs “expressed [she] would 
be able to handle all of that [i.e., front counter work], that 
it wouldn’t be problematic for you.”  Id.  Tucker added, “I 
don’t have any place that I can use your services.”  Id.  If 
Tucker had called the meeting without knowledge of the 
accommodation request, it is unlikely that she would have 
addressed the possibility of reassigning Jacobs.  Moreover, when 
Jacobs asked whether she was being fired “because of the e-
mail,” Tucker responded that “it doesn’t have anything to do 
with the e-mail.”  Id.  If Tucker were truly unaware of the 
contents of the e-mail, it is unlikely that she would have 
answered the question in this way.   
A reasonable jury could infer from Jacobs’s, Tucker’s, and 
Kennedy’s testimony and from the recording of the conversation 
that Tucker knew about Jacobs’s accommodation request at the 
time she decided to terminate Jacobs.  Accordingly, we reverse 
the district court’s determination to the contrary.  
20 
 
III. 
Merely concluding that disputed issues of fact exist as to 
whether Jacobs was disabled and whether Tucker knew about her 
accommodation request does not end our inquiry.  Rather, we must 
also decide whether disputed issues of fact exist as to elements 
of each of Jacobs’s three claims: (i) disability discrimination; 
(ii) retaliation; and (iii) failure to provide a reasonable 
accommodation.  We address each claim in turn.  
  
A. 
We first consider whether we should affirm summary judgment 
on Jacobs’s disability discrimination claim. 
To establish a claim for disability discrimination under 
the ADA, a plaintiff must prove “(1) that she has a disability, 
(2) that she is a ‘qualified individual’ for the employment in 
question, and (3) that [her employer] discharged her (or took 
other adverse employment action) because of her disability.”  
EEOC v. Stowe-Pharr Mills, Inc., 216 F.3d 373, 377 (4th Cir. 
2000).  Disability discrimination may be proven through direct 
and indirect evidence or through the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework.9  See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 
49–50 & n.3 (2003). 
                                                 
9  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 
(1973).   
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1. 
 The AOC argues that Jacobs did not have a disability as a 
matter of law. 10   “Disability” is defined by the ADA as “a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more major life activities.”  42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).  The ADA 
provides a nonexhaustive list of major life activities, 
including “speaking,” “concentrating,” “thinking,” 
“communicating,” and “working.”  Id. § 12102(2)(A).  The EEOC 
has also identified “interacting with others” as a major life 
activity.  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i). 
 “In September 2008, Congress broadened the definition of 
‘disability’ by enacting the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553 . . . .”  Summers v. Altarum Inst., 
Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 2014).  The ADA Amendments 
Act (ADAAA) was intended to make it “easier for people with 
disabilities to obtain protection under the ADA.”  29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.1(c)(4).  The regulation clarifies that “[t]he primary 
object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be 
whether covered entities have complied with their obligations 
and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether the 
individual meets the definition of disability.”  Id. “[T]he 
                                                 
10 As noted above, this argument is inconsistent with AOC’s 
prior litigation position.  J.A. 1027 (“For the sake of summary 
judgment, Defendants have conceded that Plaintiff had a 
disability.”).   
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question of whether an individual’s impairment is a disability 
under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis.”  Pub. L. 
No. 110-325, § 2(b)(5) (2008).  In enacting the ADAAA, Congress 
abrogated earlier inconsistent caselaw.  Summers, 740 F.3d at 
331. 
 Jacobs alleges that her social anxiety disorder 
substantially limited her ability to interact with others and 
was therefore a disability.  The AOC first argues that no 
evidence in the record shows that Jacobs was suffering from 
social anxiety disorder while employed as a deputy clerk.  This 
is clearly incorrect.  As discussed above, the testimony of 
Dr. Coleman suffices to establish a genuine dispute of fact on 
this question.  
 The AOC next argues that Jacobs’s social anxiety disorder 
did not substantially limit any major life activity because 
“interacting with others” is not a major life activity.  This 
argument constitutes a challenge to the EEOC’s interpretation of 
the ADA.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i) (identifying 
“interacting with others” as a major life activity).  We 
therefore apply the familiar two-step Chevron analysis. 11   See 
Jones v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 427 (4th Cir. 
                                                 
11 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
23 
 
1999) (affording Chevron deference to the EEOC’s interpretation 
of a Title VII provision expressly adopted by the ADA).   
 Under Chevron, we first ask whether Congress has “directly 
spoken” to the precise question of whether interacting with 
others is a major life activity.  Summers, 740 F.3d at 331.  By 
its express language, the statute’s list of major life 
activities is not exhaustive.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (“[M]ajor 
life activities include, but are not limited to . . . .” 
(emphasis added)).  We therefore conclude that Congress has 
deliberately left a gap for the agency to fill, and proceed to 
Chevron’s second step--determining whether the EEOC’s regulation 
is reasonable.  Summers, 740 F.3d at 331-32.   
 “The stated goal of the ADAAA is to expand the scope of 
protection available under the Act as broadly as the text 
permits.”  Id. at 332.  A major life activity is one that is “of 
central importance to daily life.”  Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. Inc. 
v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) (abrogated in part by the 
ADAAA).  Few activities are more central to the human condition 
than interacting with others.  If “bending” and “lifting” are 
major life activities, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), it is certainly 
reasonable for the EEOC to conclude that interacting with others 
falls in the same category.  Identifying “interacting with 
others” as a major life activity comparable to “caring for 
oneself,” “speaking,” “learning,” and “communicating” advances 
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the broad remedial purpose of the ADA.  We therefore defer to 
the EEOC’s determination and hold that interacting with others 
is a major life activity. 
 The AOC also argues that Jacobs has failed to show that her 
alleged social anxiety disorder substantially limited her 
ability to interact with others.  Prior to the ADAAA, a 
plaintiff seeking to prove disability needed to show that she 
was “significantly restricted” in a major life activity.  See, 
e.g., Pollard v. High’s of Balt., Inc., 281 F.3d 462, 467 (4th 
Cir. 2002).  The ADAAA expressly rejected this rule as imposing 
“too high a standard.”  Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 2(a)(8).  The 
regulations define a substantially limiting impairment as one 
that “substantially limits the ability of an individual to 
perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the 
general population.”  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). 12   “An 
impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely 
restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity 
in order to be considered substantially limiting.”  Id. 
 The AOC argues that Jacobs could not have been 
substantially limited in interacting with others because she 
                                                 
12  Because both parties accept the EEOC regulations as 
instructive, we assume without deciding that they are reasonable 
and have no occasion to decide what level of deference, if any, 
they are due.  See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 194; Heiko v. Colombo 
Sav. Bank, F.S.B., 434 F.3d 249, 255 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006).   
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“interact[ed] with others on a daily basis,” “routinely answered 
inquiries from the public at the front counter,” “socialized 
with her co-workers outside of work,” and engaged in social 
interaction on Facebook.  Appellees’ Br. at 26, 29.  The AOC 
misapprehends both the meaning of “substantially limits” and the 
nature of social anxiety disorder.   
 A person need not live as a hermit in order to be 
“substantially limited” in interacting with others.  According 
to the APA, a person with social anxiety disorder will either 
avoid social situations or “endure the social or performance 
situation . . . with intense anxiety.”  DSM-IV, supra, at 451.13  
Thus, the fact that Jacobs may have endured social situations 
does not per se preclude a finding that she had social anxiety 
disorder.  Rather, Jacobs need only show she endured these 
situations “with intense anxiety.”  Id.  At a minimum, Jacobs’s 
testimony that working the front counter caused her extreme 
stress and panic attacks creates a disputed issue of fact on 
this issue. 14   Her testimony is also consistent with 
                                                 
13  We also note in passing that if Jacobs in fact took 
longer than necessary to complete her microfilming work and 
procrastinated in returning to the front desk (as the AOC 
alleges), this may constitute avoidant behavior consistent with 
a diagnosis of social anxiety disorder. 
14  Although members of the public will not experience 
intense anxiety and panic when asked a question by a stranger, 
Jacobs alleges that working the front counter caused her extreme 
stress and panic attacks.  According to the DSM-IV, between 3% 
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Dr. Coleman’s testimony that Jacobs suffered from social anxiety 
disorder within the meaning of the DSM-IV. 
  The undisputed facts that Jacobs spoke to coworkers and 
attempted to perform her job at the front counter are therefore 
not fatal to her claim.  That she attended several outings with 
coworkers in her nine months in the office is also hardly 
dispositive--answering questions at the front counter 
constitutes a performance situation that is different in 
character from having lunch with coworkers, and a reasonable 
jury may conclude that Jacobs’s allegedly debilitating anxiety 
was specific to that situation.  Finally, to the extent that 
Jacobs’s Facebook activity constitutes a “mitigating measure” 
(that is, a form of exposure therapy by which Jacobs attempted 
to overcome her anxiety through social interaction that was not 
face-to-face and not in real time) we are not permitted to 
consider it in determining the existence of a substantial 
limitation on her ability to interact with others.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(4)(E)(i).  We therefore find that a reasonable jury 
                                                                                                                                                             
and 13% of people will experience social anxiety disorder at 
some point in their life. DSM-IV, supra, at 453.  Just 10% of 
people who experience a fear of public speaking experience 
enough impairment or distress to be diagnosed with social 
anxiety disorder.  Id.  We therefore conclude that social 
anxiety disorder limits sufferers “as compared to most people in 
the general population.”  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). 
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could conclude that Jacobs was substantially limited in her 
ability to interact with others and thus disabled within the 
meaning of the ADA. 
 
2. 
We turn next to the second element of the prima facie case: 
whether Jacobs has shown that she was a qualified individual for 
the employment in question.  The AOC argues that no reasonable 
jury could find that, at the time of her discharge, Jacobs was 
“performing her job at a level that met her employer’s 
legitimate expectations.”  See Ennis v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bus. & 
Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 58, 61–62 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(finding that summary judgment was appropriate when an employee 
had received numerous negative performance evaluations and 
written reprimands over three years, was suspended for poor 
performance, and conceded that she was not a model employee and 
made too many personal phone calls).  The AOC supports this 
argument with considerable testimony regarding Jacobs’s 
shortcomings as an employee.   
Jacobs responds by denying these allegations and noting 
that she was promoted to the position of deputy clerk after only 
a month on the job.  She further argues that she never received 
a negative performance review, evaluation, or written warning, 
and that the AOC’s testimony could be discredited at trial as 
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inconsistent and contradictory.  Cf. EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & 
Co., 243 F.3d 846, 852–53 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that an 
employer’s provision of shifting and inconsistent justifications 
for taking an adverse employment action “is, in and of itself, 
probative of pretext”).  For example, AOC witnesses testified 
that Ashley English, an AOC employee, told them about Jacobs’s 
performance issues and inappropriate outbursts.  English, 
however, testified that she never discussed Jacobs’s performance 
with the AOC witnesses and that Jacobs never had an 
inappropriate outburst.  From these inconsistencies and the 
total lack of documentary evidence of Jacobs’s alleged poor 
performance, a reasonable jury could conclude that Jacobs was 
qualified for the position of deputy clerk. 
 
3. 
Disputed issues of material fact also exist as to the third 
element of the prima facie case--causation.  The AOC argues that 
Jacobs cannot prove causation because no reasonable jury could 
find that Tucker knew of Jacobs’s disability at the time Jacobs 
was terminated.  We disagree. 
 First, the note Tucker placed in Jacobs’s personnel file 
demonstrates that Tucker was aware as early as May 5, 2009 (more 
than three months before the termination) that Jacobs had “nerve 
issues,” an “anxiety disorder,” and that she “might have to go 
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back to [the doctor].”  J.A. 823.  Second, just before firing 
Jacobs, Tucker met with the three supervisors who had received 
Jacobs’s e-mailed accommodation request.  One of these 
supervisors told Jacobs that she intended to discuss the request 
with Tucker upon Tucker’s return from vacation.  Drawing all 
reasonable inferences in Jacobs’s favor, Tucker and the 
supervisors likely discussed Jacobs’s disability at this meeting 
immediately before firing her.  A reasonable jury could thus 
find that Tucker knew that Jacobs was disabled.  See Schmidt v. 
Safeway Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 997 (D. Or. 1994) (“The employer 
need only know the underlying facts, not the legal significance 
of those facts.”). 
Contrary to the AOC’s contention, Jacobs has produced 
affirmative evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude 
that she was terminated because of her disability.  See Ennis, 
53 F.3d at 59.  She was fired just three weeks after sending her 
e-mail disclosing her disability and requesting an 
accommodation.  Such close temporal proximity weighs heavily in 
favor of finding a genuine dispute as to causation.  See 
Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 252 F.3d 696, 706 (4th Cir. 
2001) (finding that temporal proximity alone can create a 
genuine dispute to causation).  
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We therefore find that a reasonable jury could conclude 
that Jacobs has made out each of the elements of a prima facie 
case of discriminatory discharge. 
 
4. 
Under the familiar McDonnell Douglas framework, the burden 
then shifts to the AOC to produce evidence of a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for terminating Jacobs.  See McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.  The AOC produced evidence of a 
number of non-discriminatory reasons for Jacobs’s termination 
including: Jacobs was not “getting it”; she had outbursts and 
became angry with her trainer; she slept on the job; and she 
failed to follow the appropriate procedure for calling in sick.  
For summary judgment purposes, we thus find that the AOC has 
satisfied this relatively modest burden.   
The burden therefore shifts back to Jacobs to prove that 
these asserted justifications are pretextual.  Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000).  
Among other methods, she may do so by demonstrating that the 
asserted justifications, even if true, are post hoc 
rationalizations invented for purposes of litigation.  Dennis v. 
Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr. , Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 647 (4th Cir. 
2002).  Jacobs argues that the AOC’s proffered reasons are 
pretextual because: (i) the AOC has offered different rationales 
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at different phases of the litigation and (ii) the AOC’s 
evidence is inconsistent and contradictory. 
 The fact that an employer “has offered different 
justifications at different times for [an adverse employment 
action] is, in and of itself, probative of pretext.”  Sears 
Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d at 852–53.  At the time of termination, 
Tucker told Jacobs that she was being fired for not “getting 
it,” for being slow, for lying about her ability to do the job, 
and for her “propensity for mistakes.”  J.A. 827.  In her EEOC 
complaint, Tucker put forward additional reasons: Jacobs had 
“outbursts,” got angry with her trainer, and would disruptively 
ask her co-workers how to perform tasks.  J.A. 686.  After 
Jacobs filed suit, the AOC put forward still more reasons, 
claiming that Jacobs slept on the job and failed to follow 
procedures for calling in sick.   
Although this constellation of justifications is not 
internally inconsistent, many of the purported justifications 
were not raised at the time of termination. Even more striking 
is that no one at the AOC documented any of the justifications 
(including those raised at the time of termination) in any way.  
Moreover, all of the annotations on the e-mail printout (that 
Tucker testified reflect her contemporaneous account of the 
reasons for firing Jacobs) concern her disability, use of sick 
leave, and request for accommodation; none concern the 
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justifications raised during the course of litigation.  Drawing 
all reasonable inferences in favor of Jacobs, we conclude that 
the AOC’s undocumented and uncorroborated justifications are 
pretextual and were not the actual reason for Jacobs’s 
termination.15 
 In addition, substantial circumstantial evidence 
contradicts Tucker’s testimony that she decided to fire Jacobs 
after learning that Jacobs had been sleeping on the job.  See 
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151 (stating that courts need not credit the 
moving party’s evidence when it is either contradicted or 
impeached by the nonmoving party).  First, even though Jacobs’s 
alleged sleeping was purportedly central to Tucker’s decision to 
fire her, Tucker did not discuss it in the termination meeting 
or in responding to the EEOC.  Rather, the story emerged for the 
first time during discovery in this suit.  Second, Tucker’s 
deposition testimony contains numerous inconsistencies.  For 
example, she testified about a discussion that purportedly took 
place during the termination meeting, but that discussion is 
entirely absent from the unaltered audio recording of that 
                                                 
15 Jacobs also argues that the AOC’s evidence regarding the 
justifications for firing Tucker is self-defeating.  
Specifically, she notes that although all of Jacobs’s 
supervisors testified that they learned of Jacobs’s performance 
issues from co-worker Ashley English, English testified that she 
never discussed Jacobs’s performance with them.  We conclude 
that English’s testimony creates a genuine dispute of fact 
regarding Jacobs’s alleged performance issues. 
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meeting.  See Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 165 (5th Cir. 
2009) (per curiam) (“Summary judgment is not appropriate when 
‘questions about the credibility of key witnesses loom large’ 
and the evidence could permit the trier-of-fact to treat their 
testimony with ‘skeptical scrutiny.’” (ellipsis omitted) 
(quoting Thomas v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 233 F.3d 326, 331 
(5th Cir. 2000))).  
Third, Radewicz--who testified that she observed Jacobs 
sleeping at her desk and called Tucker while she was away on 
vacation to let her know--also testified that she was coached by 
Tucker regarding specific details of her testimony on the 
morning of her deposition. 16   Fourth and finally, Radewicz’s 
testimony is significantly implausible.  Tucker testified that, 
while she was on vacation, she asked to be called only in the 
event of an emergency and that the only call she received was 
from Radewicz.  In order to credit Tucker and Radewicz, then, a 
jury would have to believe that the only “emergency” that 
occurred in the courthouse during Tucker’s three-week vacation 
was Jacobs’s purportedly sleeping on the job.  We therefore 
conclude that Jacobs’s circumstantial evidence is sufficient to 
                                                 
16  Jacobs denies ever sleeping on the job, but has not 
produced evidence directly contradicting Radewicz’s testimony 
that she called Tucker during Tucker’s vacation. 
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create a genuine dispute of fact as to whether she was fired for 
sleeping on the job.  
In sum, we find that a reasonable jury could conclude that 
Jacobs has set out a prima facie case of disability 
discrimination and sufficient evidence of pretext to ultimately 
prevail on her claim.  The district court thus erred in granting 
summary judgment on Jacobs’s disability discrimination claim. 
 
B. 
 We next consider whether we should affirm summary judgment 
on Jacobs’s retaliatory discharge claim.  The ADA provides that 
“no person shall discriminate against any individual” for 
engaging in protected opposition or participation activity.  42 
U.S.C. § 12203(a).  Jacobs alleges that she was fired because 
she engaged in protected activity; namely, requesting an 
accommodation for her social anxiety disorder.   
“In order to prevail on a claim of retaliation, a plaintiff 
must either offer sufficient direct and indirect evidence of 
retaliation, or proceed under a burden-shifting method.”  Rhoads 
v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 391 (4th Cir. 2001).  A plaintiff need 
not show that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. See 
id.  Whether a plaintiff proceeds by direct evidence or 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting, she must show (i) that she 
engaged in protected activity and, (ii) because of this, 
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(iii) her employer took an adverse employment action against 
her. Id. 
The parties do not dispute that the first and third 
elements are satisfied.  Jacobs clearly engaged in protected 
activity by submitting a request for accommodation; and the AOC 
clearly took an adverse employment action by firing her.  As set 
forth below, disputed issues of material fact exist as to 
causation under the McDonnell Douglas framework.  Accordingly, 
we reverse the grant of summary judgment as to Jacobs’s 
retaliatory discharge claim. 
 
1. 
 In assessing causation, we begin with Jacobs’s asserted 
direct and indirect evidence of retaliation.  “To avoid summary 
judgment, the plaintiff must produce direct evidence of a stated 
purpose to discriminate and/or indirect evidence of sufficient 
probative force to reflect a genuine issue of material fact.”  
Rhoads, 257 F.3d at 391 (quoting Brinkley v. Harbour Recreation 
Club, 180 F.3d 598, 607 (4th Cir. 1999)) (brackets and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “What is required is evidence of 
conduct or statements that both reflect directly the alleged 
discriminatory attitude and that bear directly on the contested 
employment decision.”  Id. at 391–92 (quoting Brinkley, 180 F.3d 
at 607).   
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First, Jacobs argues that Tucker’s refusal to train her for 
positions other than the front counter, when Tucker had allowed 
the 29 other deputy clerks to train for positions other than the 
front counter, is direct evidence that Jacobs was treated 
adversely because of her request for an accommodation.  It is 
undisputed that the AOC did not provide such training 
immediately to new hires.  Jacobs does not produce any evidence 
that other deputy clerks of comparable tenure were given 
training opportunities that she was denied.  Accordingly, this 
argument is without merit. 
 Second, Jacobs argues that the actions taken by the AOC 
after she submitted her accommodation request constitute 
evidence that the AOC reacted to her request with retaliatory 
animus.  For example, although her supervisor had granted all 
her requests for leave before she sought an accommodation, her 
request for leave after seeking the accommodation was denied. 17  
Jacobs also cites as direct evidence of retaliatory animus a 
letter Tucker wrote to a superior following the termination in 
which Tucker said she had reservations about hiring Jacobs due 
to her “mousiness.”  J.A. 689.  
                                                 
17  We note that, in addition to serving as evidence of 
hostility, the denial of leave can itself be an adverse 
employment action compensable under the ADA’s retaliation 
provision.  Wells v. Gates, 336 F. App’x 378, 383–384 (4th Cir. 
2009) (per curiam). 
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Considering this evidence as a whole, we find that no 
reasonable jury could conclude on the basis of the purported 
direct and indirect evidence that Tucker fired Jacobs in 
retaliation for her request for accommodation.  Although Jacobs 
provides some indirect evidence from which a factfinder might 
infer animus, she has produced no direct evidence of retaliatory 
(as opposed to discriminatory) animus.  Tucker’s notes and 
statements during the termination meeting indicate that she may 
have intended to fire Jacobs because she was disabled, but they 
do not indicate that she intended to fire Jacobs in retaliation 
for requesting an accommodation.  Jacobs’s purported direct and 
indirect evidence is insufficient to survive summary judgment.  
  
2. 
 However, this is not the end of our analysis of 
Jacobs’s retaliation claim.  We also consider whether Jacobs can 
survive summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework.  Under this method of proof, Jacobs “must 
show (1) that [s]he engaged in protected activity; (2) that 
[her] employer took an adverse action against [her]; and (3) 
that a causal connection existed between the adverse activity 
and the protected action.”  Haulbrook, 252 F.3d at 706.  “The 
employer then has the burden ‘to rebut the presumption of 
retaliation by articulating a legitimate nonretaliatory reason 
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for its actions.’”  Rhoads, 257 F.3d at 392 (quoting Beall v. 
Abbots Labs., 130 F.3d 614, 619 (4th Cir. 1997)).  The burden 
then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered 
reason is pretext.  “The plaintiff always bears the ultimate 
burden of persuading the trier of fact that she was the victim 
of retaliation.”  Id. 
 Jacobs has established the first two elements of the prima 
facie case through undisputed evidence.  The AOC argues that 
Jacobs has failed to establish causation because there is “no 
evidence” that Tucker knew, when she decided to terminate 
Jacobs, that Jacobs had submitted an accommodation request.  
Appellees’ Br. at 43.  As we discussed above, the record in 
actuality contains ample evidence from which a reasonable jury 
could conclude that Tucker learned of Jacobs’s request for an 
accommodation before the termination meeting.  See supra Part 
II.B.3.  We therefore proceed with the causation inquiry.  
Jacobs was terminated just three weeks after requesting an 
accommodation from her supervisors.  This close temporal 
proximity is sufficient to establish a disputed issue of fact as 
to the causation element of the prima facie case.  See 
Haulbrook, 252 F.3d at 706 (“[A] contested issue of fact 
arguably exists as to . . . [causation], due solely to the 
proximity in time of [the plaintiff’s] termination on November 
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25 and his assertion on November 4 of a right to accommodation 
under the ADA.”). 
 From here, the burden-shifting inquiry proceeds just as it 
did with respect to Jacobs’s disability discrimination claim. 
For the reasons stated above in Part III.A.4, we find that a 
reasonable jury could conclude that Jacobs has set out 
sufficient evidence of pretext to ultimately prevail on her 
retaliation claim.  Thus, the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment on this claim. 
 
C. 
 Finally, we consider whether we should affirm summary 
judgment on Jacobs’s failure-to-accommodate claim.  To establish 
a prima facie case for failure to accommodate, Jacobs must show: 
“(1) that [she] was an individual who had a disability within 
the meaning of the statute; (2) that the employer had notice of 
[her] disability; (3) that with reasonable accommodation [she] 
could perform the essential functions of the position; and 
(4) that the employer refused to make such accommodations.”  
Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(brackets and ellipsis omitted).  For the reasons discussed 
above, we find that Jacobs has established a genuine dispute of 
fact regarding the first and second elements of the prima facie 
case--that is, that she had a disability and that the AOC had 
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notice of her disability.  As to the fourth element, it is 
undisputed that the AOC refused to make an accommodation for 
Jacobs.  The only remaining issue concerns the third element: 
Could a reasonable jury find that with a reasonable 
accommodation, Jacobs could perform the essential functions of 
the position of deputy clerk? 
 
1. 
 We start by determining the essential functions of the 
position of deputy clerk.  Not all job requirements or functions 
are essential.  A job function is essential when “the reason the 
position exists is to perform that function,” when there aren’t 
enough employees available to perform the function, or when the 
function is so specialized that someone is hired specifically 
because of his or her expertise in performing that function.  29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2).  “[I]f an employer has prepared a written 
description before advertising or interviewing applicants for 
the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the 
essential functions of the job.”  42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).  Other 
relevant evidence can include “the employer’s judgment as to 
which functions are essential,” “the amount of time spent on the 
job performing the function,” “the consequences of not requiring 
the incumbent to perform the function,” and the work experience 
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of people who hold the same or similar job.  29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(n)(3).18   
 We begin with the written job description for the position: 
“[D]eputy clerks perform a variety of duties including: working 
in the courtroom, providing customer service, data entry, 
typing, filing, cash receipting, case file indexing, multi-
tasking and the ability to type 35-40 corrected wpm, and various 
other tasks.”  J.A. 678.  “[P]roviding customer service” is only 
one of the many duties that deputy clerks might perform. 
We also consider the undisputed evidence in the record.  
The AOC employed 30 deputy clerks.  Of these, only four worked 
regularly at the front counter.  The others performed various 
tasks, including intake, filing, data entry, mailing documents, 
bookkeeping, and serving as a courtroom clerk.  Most new deputy 
clerks started at the front counter, purportedly because the 
front counter is where a new employee can “gain the most 
knowledge of the office.”  J.A. 434.  However, some new deputy 
clerks started in filing and were permitted to perform that task 
without first training at the front counter.  See J.A. 274 (“The 
best two places to start are filing and the front counter.”).  
Deputy clerks were trained for other roles based on seniority.  
                                                 
18  Because the parties agree that the regulations are 
instructive, we again assume their reasonableness and decline to 
determine what level of deference, if any, they are due. 
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J.A. 259 (“I worked at the front counter five days a week for 
over one year before a new deputy clerk was hired and I was 
moved off the front counter . . . .”).  
 The record contains ample evidence from which a reasonable 
jury could conclude that working at the front counter was not an 
essential function of the position of deputy clerk.  The job 
description does not indicate that all deputy clerks were 
expected to work at the front counter.  Fewer than 15% of the 
office’s deputy clerks worked behind the front counter, and some 
deputy clerks never performed this task.  Because most of the 
deputy clerks were trained to work behind the front counter, 
many employees were available to perform that function.  
Finally, the AOC has produced no evidence that mastery of the 
front desk was essential or that Jacobs’s no longer working 
behind the front counter would negatively impact the office.  We 
therefore find that Jacobs has established a genuine issue of 
fact regarding whether working behind the front counter is an 
essential function of the position of deputy clerk. 
 
2. 
 We now turn to the heart of a claim for failure to 
accommodate: whether, with a reasonable accommodation, Jacobs 
could perform the essential functions of the position of deputy 
clerk.  Wilson, 717 F.3d at 345.  This inquiry proceeds in two 
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steps.  First, was the specific accommodation requested by 
Jacobs reasonable?  Second, had the AOC granted the 
accommodation, could Jacobs perform the essential functions of 
the position?  Id. 
 A reasonable accommodation is one that “enables [a 
qualified] individual with a disability . . . to perform the 
essential functions of [a] position.”  29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(o)(1)(ii).  The statute expressly contemplates that a 
reasonable accommodation may require “job restructuring.”  42 
U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).  Jacobs’s proposed accommodation was to 
work fewer days at the counter and more days microfilming or 
performing other deputy clerk tasks.  This proposed 
accommodation did not require the AOC to increase the workload 
of Jacobs’s coworkers; Jacobs merely asked that her employer 
change which deputy clerk was assigned to which task.  Cf. 
Crabill v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 423 F. App’x 314, 
323 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that “an accommodation that would 
require other employees to work harder is unreasonable”). 19   A 
                                                 
19 That Jacobs’s request would have necessitated a departure 
from the office’s informal seniority system is of no moment.  
All deputy clerks shared a common job title and description.  In 
the absence of evidence of a formal seniority policy, that 
Jacobs’s proposed accommodation would require shifting a co-
worker with more seniority to a less desirable task does not 
render it inherently unreasonable.  Cf. EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 
237 F.3d 349, 354–355 (4th Cir. 2001) (where company’s formal 
seniority policy which had been in place for 30 years required 
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reasonable jury could therefore conclude that Jacobs’s requested 
accommodation was reasonable.  
 An employer is not required to grant even a reasonable 
accommodation unless it would enable the employee to perform all 
of the essential functions of her position.  Jacobs argues that 
a transfer away from the front desk would eliminate the cause of 
her social anxiety--having to answer questions from strangers 
face-to-face all day--and enable her to meet her employer’s 
reasonable expectations.  The AOC argues that Jacobs was a poor 
performer and therefore would have been unable to perform the 
essential functions of the position even with the accommodation.  
As we found above, there is a genuine dispute of fact as to 
whether Jacobs was a poor performer.  Even assuming that Jacobs 
actually microfilmed too slowly and pestered her coworkers by 
asking for their help, a reasonable jury could conclude that 
these behaviors were manifestations of Jacobs’s performance 
anxiety and were unlikely to reemerge had the accommodation been 
granted.  There is no uncontradicted evidence that Jacobs’s 
social anxiety disorder interferes with her ability to file or 
perform other administrative tasks.  We therefore conclude that 
Jacobs has established a genuine dispute as to whether, with a 
                                                                                                                                                             
an employee to switch to a different shift, it was reasonable 
for the company to enforce the seniority policy).  
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reasonable accommodation, she could have performed all of the 
essential functions of the position of deputy clerk. 
 
3. 
 The ADA imposes upon employers a good-faith duty “to engage 
[with their employees] in an interactive process to identify a 
reasonable accommodation.”  Wilson, 717 F.3d at 346.  This duty 
is triggered when an employee communicates her disability and 
desire for an accommodation--even if the employee fails to 
identify a specific, reasonable accommodation.  Id.  However, an 
employer will not be liable for failure to engage in the 
interactive process if the employee ultimately fails to 
demonstrate the existence of a reasonable accommodation that 
would allow her to perform the essential functions of the 
position.  Id. at 347; see also Deily v. Waste Mgmt. of 
Allentown, 55 F. App’x 605, 607 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Shapiro 
v. Twp. of Lakewood, 292 F.3d 356, 360 (3d Cir. 2002)). Two of 
our sister circuits have held that failure to “discuss a 
reasonable accommodation in a meeting in which the employer 
takes an adverse employment action” against a disabled employee 
is evidence of bad faith.  Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 
1025, 1040 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing EEOC v. Chevron Phillips 
Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 622 (5th Cir. 2009)).  
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 It is undisputed that each of Jacobs’s supervisors--
Kennedy, Excell, and Griffin--refused to discuss Jacobs’s 
accommodation request with her until Tucker returned to the 
office.  Both Radewicz and Tucker testified that Jacobs’s 
supervisors had authority to reassign employees to other tasks 
(and therefore to engage in the interactive process with 
Jacobs).  The morning that Tucker returned to the office after a 
three-week absence, she called Jacobs to her office and fired 
her without first discussing her accommodation request.  From 
these facts, a reasonable jury could easily conclude that the 
AOC acted in bad faith by failing to engage in the interactive 
process with Jacobs. 
 We therefore conclude that summary judgment is not 
warranted on Jacobs’s failure to accommodate claim. 
 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse in part the district 
court’s order granting summary judgment against Jacobs and 
remand to the district court for trial of her ADA disability 
discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate claims. 
 
AFFIRMED IN PART, 
REVERSED IN PART, 
AND REMANDED FOR TRIAL 
 
